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a fractional interest, the grant is subject to the interpretation that
it covers only the conveyed fraction of the fraction covered by the
lease.2
The other problem is presented when a lease reserves to a lessor
some interest or payment other than delay rentals and royalties,
as, for example, an oil payment. Most partial ownership clauses
are limited to such rentals and royalties. When additional inter-
ests or payments are reserved, it is important to provide in detail
that they, too, are subject to the partial ownership clause.
David G. Hanlon.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
POSSESSION OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AS APPARENT OWNERSHIP
In Oklahoma a certificate of title to an automobile is not consid-
ered a muniment of title which establishes ownership. It is intended
merely to protect the public against theft, to facilitate recovery of
stolen automobiles, and to aid the State in enforcement of its regu-
lation of motor vehicles.
In Adkisson v. Waitman' defendant's certificate of title was not
filled in other than having the signature of the dealer from whom
he purchased the car. Defendant's wife obtained possession of the
certificate by taking it from a dresser drawer without her hus-
band's knowledge and consent. She and a third party, who claimed
to be the person whose signature was on the certificate of title, sur-
rendered the certificate to the state tag agent and obtained a new
one made out to the wife. She then sold the car to the plaintiff. The
supreme court reversed the judgment of the lower court and held
that defendant was entitled to the automobile. The court based its
21 See, for example, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205
S. W. 2d. 355 (1947).
1 - Okla. - , 213 P. 2d. 465 (1949).
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decision upon the rule of personal property that no man can be
divested of his property without his consent.
The plaintiff contended that when one of two innocent persons
must suffer by the acts of a third person, the one who enabled the
third person to cause the loss must sustain it. In the cases relied
upon by the plaintiff, there was an affirmative act which placed it
in the power of the party making the transfer to mislead an inno-
cent purchaser. The court distinguished the principal case on the
ground that the defendant did not do anything to place it in his
wife's power to make a transfer of title. He did not consent to the
transfer of the certificate of title, nor did he deliver it to his wife.
The mere fact that she was permitted to use the automobile did
not constitute a clothing with authority such as to bind him when
the transfer was made without his consent.
PRIORITY OF LANDLORD'S LIENS OVER MORTGAGE LIENS
In the Texas case of Industrial State Bank v. Oldham2 a tenant
had possession of a business building under a five-year lease, when
he executed two chattel mortgages in favor of defendant bank upon
property he previously had placed in the building., The lease was
not recorded, and the bank had no actual knowledge of its terms.
When the bank foreclosed its lien, the landlord filed suit for con-
version of the mortgaged property.
The dominant question presented in the case was whether the
landlord preserved priority of his lien for rents more than 6
months past due. A Texas statute8 gives the landlord a preference
lien on property placed by the tenant in the rented building. In
order to preserve priority for rents more than 6 months past due,
as against intervening bona fide purchasers or creditors of the
tenant, the landlord must file with the county clerk a sworn state-
ment of the amount of rent due; and the statement must be re-
corded in a book provided for such purposes. The affidavit filed
and recorded at any time will secure the lien, unless the rights of
2 - Tex.- , 221 S. W. 2d. 912 (1949).
8 TEL REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon. 1948) art. 5238.
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other parties have intervened prior to the recordation. The rights
of creditors and purchasers which accrue prior to the recordation
are superior to claims for unpaid rent beyond the six-month
period.
Strict compliance with the provisions of the statute must be
had in order to preserve priority of the landlord's lien for rents
more than 6 months past due. In the instant case the landlord filed
an affidavit in the chattel mortgage department of the county clerk's
office. The affidavit was retained and indexed in the chattel mort.
gage department, but was never recorded in the book maintained
for recordation under the statute. This was not in compliance with
statutory requirements, and the landlord failed to preserve his lien
against the intervening creditor of the tenant. Another Texas
statute," which provides that an instrument shall be considered re-
corded from the time it is deposited for record, was held not appli-
cable where the statute makes the recordation of the instrument
necessary to the creation of a right.
The supreme court affirmed and reformed the judgment for the
landlord. This being a suit for conversion, the rights of the parties
were determined as of the date of the conversion. The bank's action
in taking over the mortgaged property was a conversion to the
extent of the value of the landlord's lien for rent less than 6 months
past due.
PRIORITY OF BONA FIDE PURCHASER'S RIGHT OVER MECHANIC'S
LIEN WHERE POSSESSION NOT RETAINED
The Arkansas case of Kern-Limerick, Inc., v. Emerson' dealt
with a statute6 authorizing repairmen, who part with possession of
repaired property, to preserve their lien by filing a claim with the
circuit clerk within 90 days after performance of the work or fur-
nishing materials. Such lien is inferior to the rights of an innocent
purchaser who acquires title to the property before the lien is filed
4 TEL rv. CIrv. STAT. (Vernon. 1948) art. 6596.
- Ark.-, 218 S. W. 2d. 78 (1949).
6 ArK. STAT. (1947) § 51-409.
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and is without actual notice of the existence of the claim for
repairs.
The plaintiff repaired a tractor and permitted the owner to take
it without paying for the repairs. He filed his lien within 90 days,
but the owner had sold the tractor at the time the claim was filed.
In a suit against the purchaser to enforce the lien, the question
before the court was whether the defendant was a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice, actual or constructive. The defendant had
no actual notice of the claim at the time of the sale.
Plaintiff advanced the argument that defendant knew plaintiff
had repaired the tractor at the time of the purchase and that such
knowledge was sufficient to put a reasonably prudent person on
inquiry as to whether the repair bill had been paid. Cases were
cited to support the principle that where a person has sufficient
information to put him on inquiry, he is charged with knowledge
of what the inquiry would disclose. The supreme court distin-
guished the principal case from those relied upon by the plaintiff
and affirmed the lower court's holding that the defendant was a
bona fide purchaser without notice. The cases relied upon by plain-
tiff involved liens of materialmen and laborers upon lands and im-
provements. The priority section of the materialmen's lien statute7
does not contain the exception in favor of a bona fide purchaser
without actual or constructive notice of the lien as does the statute
here involved.
GRAss AND STRAW AS EMBLEMENTS
In New Mexico perennial grass, straw, and stalk pastures were
held not to be crops in the sense that they may be used or removed
from the premises after the termination of 'a lease. This is par-
ticularly true if the straw is not in ricks or stacks.
The case of Czerner v. Kerby' involved a farm lease which stip-
ulated that at the termination of the lease, the landlord should
7 ARK. STAT. (1947) § 51-605.
8" N. M.- , 207 P. 2d. 531 (1949).
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compensate the tenant for his proportionate share of the proceeds
of any crops growing on the premises. The lease was properly ter-
minated by the landlord at a time when the crop for the year was
completely harvested. The grain had been combined and straw left
as it fell in the fields. In a suit brought by the landlord for his
proportionate share of the alfalfa grown on the premises and sold
by the tenant, the tenant counterclaimed for the value of the native
grass, straw and stalk pastures under the doctrine of emblements.
This counterclaim was denied, and the supreme court affirmed the
decision. The intention of the parties as expressed in the lease was
said to be controlling in determining whether natural grass, straw,
and stalk pastures are crops. Here the purpose of the lease and the
primary interest of the tenant was the production of grain and
alfalfa.
The court distinguished the case of Weddle v. Parrish,9 where
the lease in question was primarily a grass lease intended to be
used for late pasturing of sheep. Grass was the crop involved, and
it was held that under such conditions the tenant was entitled to
the use of the premises after the termination of the lease.
REGULATIONS AS TO ABANDONED PROPERTY
In 1949 Arkansas enacted The Abandoned Property Act,'" which
makes abandoned personal property subject to escheat to the State.
This statute pertains to personalty which has lain unclaimed, for-
gotten or lost for 7 years. It includes all kinds of personal prop-
erty, tangible and intangible (excepting insurance and funds held
by banks and building and loan associations). The Attorney Gen-
eral is authorized to make inquiry concerning such property and
to bring suit against any person holding abandoned property. Any
interested person may intervene, and notice must be given to all
former owners and claimants. The proceeds from the sale of aban-
doned property are held in a Separate Escheat Fund and credited
at the end of two years to the Public School Fund.
9 135 Ore. 545. 295 Pac. 454 (1931).
10 ARK. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1949) Ch. 6.
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CREATION OF LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP BY
RENTAL OF SAFETY DEPOSIT Box
Oklahoma has enacted a statute" regulating the rental of safety
deposit boxes. This statute stipulates that the relationship of the
parties is that of landlord and tenant, and the landlord owes the
tenant the duty of ordinary care in maintaining such boxes. The
landlord has a lien upon the contents for past due rentals and
expense of replacement of locks, and may sell the contents after
complying with statutory requirements of notice. The landlord
may also contract to limit liability. It is to be noted that a similar
statute was enacted in Texas in 1943.12
MORTGAGES ON GOODS EXPOSED TO SALE
Texas has amended Article 4000 of the Revised Civil Statutes,1"
concerning mortgages on goods exposed to sale. This statute de-
clares that every mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien given by
the owner of such goods shall be deemed fraudulent and void. The
amended portion provides that this Article does not apply to any
mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien given to secure the purchase
price of such goods, except as to retail sales made in the regular
course of business.
The amendment was passed because many small businesses and
merchants must purchase their stocks of goods from manufacturers
outside the state and of necessity must finance their transactions
through local banks or other agencies. Local banks and other
agencies can now with increased safety accept a chattel mortgage
or other security for the purchase price of such goods.
Helen Wood.
'1 OKL.. STAT. ANN. (Special Law Pamphlet, End of 1949 Laws), Tit. 6, Ch. 18.
12 Trz. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 342-906.
33 VERNoN's TEx. Sass. LAws (1949), 51st Legis., Ch. 82, p. 137.
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